We investigate the effects of fragmentation in equity markets on the quality of trading outcomes in a panel of FTSE stocks over the period [2008][2009][2010][2011]. This period coincided with a great deal of turbulence in the UK equity markets which had multiple causes that need to be controlled for. To achieve this, we use the common correlated effects estimator for large heterogeneous panels. We extend this estimator to quantile regression to analyze the whole conditional distribution of market quality. We find that both fragmentation in visible order books and dark trading that is offered outside the visible order book lower volatility. But dark trading increases the variability of volatility, while visible fragmentation has the opposite effect in particular at the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution. The transition from a monopolistic to a fragmented market is non-monotonic with respect to the degree of fragmentation.
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Introduction
The implementation of the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)" has had a profound impact on the organization of security exchanges in Europe.
Most importantly, it abolished the concentration rule in European countries that required all trading to be conducted on primary exchanges and it created a competitive environment for equity trading; new types of trading venues that are known as Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) or Systematic Internalizers (SI) were created that fostered this competition. As a result, MiFID has served as a catalyst for the competition between equity marketplaces we observe today. The first round of MiFID was implemented across Europe on November 1st, 2007, although fragmentation of the UK equity market began sometime before that (since the UK did not have a formal concentration rule), and by 13th July, 2007, Chi-X was actively trading all of the FTSE 100 stocks. In October 2012, the volume of the FTSE 100 stocks traded via the London Stock Exchange (LSE) had declined to 53%.
1 Similar developments have taken place across Europe.
At the same time, there has been a trend towards industry consolidation: a number of mergers of exchanges allowed cost reductions through "synergies" and also aided standardization and pan European trading. For example, Chi-X was acquired by BATS in 2011. There are reasons to think that consolidation fosters market quality. A single, consolidated exchange market creates network externalities. Some have argued that security exchanges even qualify as natural monopolies. On the other hand, there are arguments for why competition between trading venues can improve market quality. Higher competition generally promotes technological innovation, improves efficiency and reduces the fees that have to paid by investors.
Furthermore, traders that use Smart Order Routing Technologies (SORT) can still benefit from network externalities in a fragmented market place.
In view of the ambiguous theoretical predictions, whether the net effect of fragmentation on market quality is negative or positive is an empirical question. In this paper, we investigate the effect of visible fragmentation and dark trading on measures of market quality such as volatility, liquidity, and trading volume in the UK equity market. Our analysis distinguishes between the effect of fragmentation on average market quality on the one hand and on its variability on the other hand.
The first question sheds light on the relationship between fragmentation and market quality during "normal" times. In contrast, the second question investigates whether there is any evidence that fragmentation of trading has led to an increase in the frequency of liquidity droughts or to more extraordinary price moves. This latter issue has been raised in several studies that have analyzed the Flash Crash and other recent market meltdowns. Of course, there is no market structure that can entirely eliminate variability in liquidity or trading volume. But regulators aim at constructing a robust market structure that contributes to an orderly and resilient functioning of equity markets in times of market turmoil. One reason for this objective is that investors particularly value the ability to trade in times of market stress and a stable market structure is thus important to maintain investor confidence (SEC, 2013) .
We use a novel dataset that allows us to calculate weekly measures for overall fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading that is offered outside the visible order book for each firm of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 indices. We combine this with data on indicators of market quality. To investigate the effect of fragmentation on market quality, we use a version of Pesaran's (2006) common correlated effects (CCE) estimator for heterogeneous panels. That model is suitable for our data because it can account for common but unobserved factors that affect both fragmentation and market quality. For example, these factors account for the activity of High Frequency Traders (HFT) whose activity has generated so much scrutiny (Foresight, 2012) . The unobserved factors also control for the global 3 financial crisis, changes in trading technology or new types of trading strategies. We extend Pesaran's (2006) estimator to quantile regression (the QCCE estimator) to analyze the whole conditional distribution of market quality. This estimator is also robust to large observations on the response.
We find that overall fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading lower volatility at the LSE. But dark trading increases the variability of volatility, while fragmentation has the opposite effect, in particular at the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution. This result is robust across several alternative measures of variability in market quality. Trading volume both globally and locally at the LSE is higher if visible order books are less fragmented or if there is more dark trading. Compared to a monopoly, visible fragmentation lowers liquidity measured by quoted bid-ask spreads at the LSE. We also investigate the transition between monopoly and competition in terms of the level of fragmentation. We find this transition is non-monotonic for overall and visible fragmentation and takes the form of an inverted U shape. The level of optimal fragmentation varies across individual firms but it is positively related to market capitalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. The data and measures for fragmentation and market quality are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 proposes an econometric framework suitable for answering the questions of interest and Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. The online appendix provides additional empirical results and a theoretical justification for our QCCE estimator.
Related Literature
Recently, regulators in both Europe and the US introduced new provisions to modernize and strengthen their financial markets. The "Regulation of National Markets Turquoise and BATS to price discovery in the UK equity market. They find that the most liquid trading venues LSE and Chi-X dominate price discovery. Over time, the importance of Chi-X in price discovery has increased.
Overall, the evidence for Europe suggests that the positive effects of fragmentation on market quality outweighs its negative effects. A possible reason for the observed improvement in market quality despite the lack of trade-through protection and a consolidated tape are algorithmic traders and HFT (Riordan et al., 2011) .
By relying on SORT, these traders create a virtually integrated marketplace in the absence of a commonly owned central limit order book. 
Data and Measurement Issues
This section discusses how we measure fragmentation, dark trading and market quality. Our data on market quality and fragmentation covers the period from May The data allows us to distinguish between public exchanges with a visible order book ("lit"), regulated venues with an invisible order book ("regulated dark pools"), over the counter ("OTC") venues, and systematic internalizers ("SI"). 
Market Quality
We measure market quality by volatility, liquidity, and trading volume of the FTSE 100 and 250 stocks. Since our measure of fragmentation is only available at a weekly frequency, all measures of market quality are constructed as weekly medians of the daily measures.
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With the exception of trading volume, our measures of market quality are calculated using data from the LSE. In that sense, our measures are local as compared to global measures that are constructed by consolidating measures from all markets.
Global measures are relevant for investors that have access to SORT, while local measures are important for small investment firms that are only connected to the primary exchange (perhaps to save costs) or for retail investors that are restricted by the best execution policy of their investment firm. 9 For example, Gomber et al.
(2012) provide evidence that 20 out of 75 execution policies in their sample state that they only execute orders at the primary exchange.
Volatility. Volatility is often described in negative terms, but its interpretation should depend on the perspective and on the type of volatility. 10 For example, Bartram et al. (2012) argue that volatility levels in the US are in many respects higher than in other countries but this reflects more innovation and competition rather than poor market quality.
One well known method to estimate volatility is due to Parkinson (1980) . The
Parkinson estimator is based on the realized range that can be computed from daily high and low price. It has recently been shown to be relatively robust to microstructure noise, see Alizadeh et al. (2002) . The Rogers and Satchell (1991) estimator is an enhancement of the Parkinson estimator that makes additional use of the opening and closing prices. Rogers and Satchell (1991) show that their estimator is unbiased for the volatility parameter of a Brownian motion plus drift, whereas the Parkinson estimator is biased in that case. Formally, the Rogers and Satchell volatility estimator can be computed as
where V it j denotes volatility of stock i on day j within week t, and However, this conclusion would be premature because many other events took place at the same time, most importantly, the global financial crisis.
We also decompose total volatility into temporary and permanent volatility.
Permanent volatility relates to the underlying uncertainty about the future pay-off stream for the asset in question. If new information about future payoffs arrives and that is suddenly impacted in prices, the price series would appear to be volatile, but this is the type of volatility that reflects the true valuation purpose of the stock market. On the other hand, volatility that is unrelated to fundamental information and that is caused by the interactions of traders over-and under-reacting to perceived events is thought of as temporary volatility. 11 To decompose total volatility into a temporary and permanent component, we assume that permanent volatility can be approximated by a smooth time trend. For each stock, temporary volatility is defined as the residuals from the nonparametric regression of total volatility on (rescaled) time (this is effectively a moving average over 1 quarter with declining weights). This approach has been used previously by e.g. Engle and Rangel (2008) .
The evolution of temporary volatility is shown in the upper right panel of Figure 3 .
Liquidity. Liquidity is a fundamental property of a well-functioning market, and lack of liquidity is generally at the heart of many financial crises and disasters.
In practice, researchers and practitioners rely on a variety of measures to capture liquidity. High frequency measures include quoted bid-ask spreads (tightness), the number of orders resting on the order book (depth) and the price impact of trades (resilience). These order book measures may not provide a complete picture since trades may not take place at quoted prices, and so empirical work considers additional measures that take account of both the order book and the transaction record. These include the so-called effective spreads and quoted spreads, which are now widely accepted and used measures of actual liquidity. Another difficulty is that liquidity suppliers often post limit orders on multiple venues but cancel the additional liquidity after the trade is executed on one venue (van Kervel, 2012) .
11 A good example is the "hash crash" of April 24, 2013 when the Dow Jones index dropped by nearly 2% very rapidly due apparently to announcements emanating from credible twitter accounts (that had been hacked into) that there had been an explosion at the White House. It subsequently recovered all the losses when it became clear that no such explosion had occurred. See http://blueandgreentomorrow.com/2013/04/24/twitter-hoax-wipes-200bn-off-dowjones-for-five-minutes/, accessed on June 20, 2013 Therefore, global depth measures that aggregate quotes across different venues may overstate liquidity. On the other hand, the presence of "iceberg orders" and dark pools suggest that there is substantial hidden liquidity.
Since we do not have access to order book data, our main measure of liquidity is the percentage bid-ask spread.
12 . The quoted bid ask spread for stock i on day t j is defined as
where daily ask prices P A and bid prices P B are obtained from Datastream. Volume. Volume of trading is a measure of participation, and is of concern to regulators (Foresight, 2012). The volume of trading has increased over the longer term, but the last decade has seen less sustained trend increases, which has generated concern amongst those whose business model depends on this. Some have also argued that computer based trading has led to much smaller holding times of stocks and higher turnover and that this would reflect a deepening of the intermediation chain rather than real benefits to investors.
We investigate both global volume and volume at the LSE. Global volume is defined as the number of shares traded at all venues and volume at the LSE is the number of shares traded at the LSE, scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
The volume data is obtained from Fidessa. Towards the end of the sample period, global and LSE volume diverge, as alternative venues gain market share (Figures 3 12 Mizen (2010) documents that trends in quoted bid-ask spreads are similar to trends in effective bid-ask spreads.
and 4).
4 Econometric Methodology Figure 3 shows the time series of market quality measures for the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 index. All measures clearly show the effect of the global financial crisis that was associated with an increase in total volatility, temporary volatility and bid-ask spreads as well as a fall in traded volumes in the early part of the sample that was followed by reversals (except for volume). As we saw in Figure 1 , average fragmentation levels increased for most of the sample. If there were a simple linear relationship between fragmentation and market quality then we would have extrapolated continually deteriorating market quality levels until almost the end of the sample. We next turn to the econometric methods that we will use to exploit the cross-sectional and time series variation in fragmentation and market quality to measure the relationship more reliably.
We extend the CCE estimator of Pesaran (2006) in three ways. First, we allow for some nonlinearity, allowing fragmentation to affect the response variable in a quadratic fashion. This functional form was also adopted in the De Jong et al. (2011) study. Second, we use quantile regression methods based on conditional quantile restrictions rather than the conditional mean restrictions adopted previously.
13 This method is valid under weaker moment conditions and is robust to outliers. Third, we also model the conditional variance of market quality using the same type of regression model; we apply the median regression method for estimation based on the squared residuals from the median specification or on the conditional interquartile range. This allows us to look at not just the average effect of fragmentation on market quality but also at the variability of that effect.
13 We provide a justification of this method in the online appendix.
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A model for heterogeneous panel data with common factors
We observe a sample of panel data {(Y it , X it , Z it , d t ) : i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T }, where i denotes the i-th stock and t is the time point of observation. In our data, Y it denotes market quality and X it is a measure of fragmentation, while Z it is a vector of firm specific control variables such as market capitalization and d t are observable common factors as for example VIX or the lagged index return. We assume that the data come from the model
where f t ∈ R k denotes the unobserved common factor or factors. We allow for a nonlinear effect of the fragmentation variable on the outcome variable by including the quadratic term. We assume that the regression error term satisfies the conditional median restrictions
but is allowed to be serially correlated or weakly cross-sectionally correlated. The regressors W it = (X it , Z it ) are assumed to have the factor structure
where D i and K i are matrices of factor loadings. The error term u it is assumed to satisfy Eu it = 0 for all t, but is also allowed to be serially correlated or weakly crosssectionally correlated, see Assumptions 1-2 in Pesaran (2006). The econometric model (3)-(5) also allows for certain types of "endogeneity" between the covariates and the outcome variable represented by the unobserved factors f t . 14 The model is very general and contains many homogenous and heterogeneous panel data models as a special case.
We adopt the random coefficient specification for the individual parameters, that is, β i = (β 1i , β 2i , β 3i ) are i.i.d. across i and
where the individual deviations v i are distributed independently of jt , X jt , Z jt and
To estimate the model (3)- (5), we extend Pesaran's (2006) CCE mean group estimator to quantile regression. Taking cross-sectional averages of (5), we obtain (under the assumption that u it has weak cross-sectional dependence and some finite higher order moments)
Equation (7) Because of the high correlation between VIX and cross-sectional averages of market quality, we expect that VIX is a good and predetermined proxy for cross-sectional averages of market quality in our regressions.
The effect of fragmentation on market quality can be obtained by performing (for each i) a time series quantile regression estimation of (3) replacing f t by W t .
Specifically, let θ i minimize the objective functions
with respect to θ, where θ = (π, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , γ , ξ ) and ρ τ (x) = x(τ − 1(x < 0)), see Koenker (2005) . Then β i are the estimators of the corresponding parameters of interest.
At any quantile, the quantile mean group estimator (QCCE) β = n −1 n i=1 β i is defined as the cross-sectional average of the individual quantile estimates β i = ( β 1i , β 2i , β 3i ) . This measures the average effect. Some idea of the heterogeneity can be obtained by looking at the standard deviations of the individual effects. Following similar arguments as in Pesaran (2006), (as n → ∞) it follows that
where the covariance matrix Σ can be estimated by
The regression model above concentrates on the average effect, or the effect in "normal times". We are also interested in the effect of fragmentation on the variability of market quality. We can address this issue by investigating the conditional variance of market quality. We adopt a symmetrical specification whereby
where the parameters b i = (b 1i , b 2i , b 3i ) have a random coefficient specification like (6). We estimate this by median regression of the squared residuals 2 it from (3)-(5) on
We argue in the online appendix that, under suitable regularity conditions, (9) holds in this case with a covariance matrix Σ (corresponding to the covariance matrix of the parameters of the variance equation).
As an alternative specification for the variability of market quality, we assume that the conditional interquartile range of market quality satisfies
where q τ (Y it |X it , Z it , d t , f t ) denotes the conditional τ quantile. (12) is estimated by median regression of the conditional interquartile range on
Parameter of Interest
We are interested in measuring the market quality at different levels of competition, holding everything else constant. In particular, we would like to compare monopoly with perfect competition. In our data, the maximum number of trading venues is 24 and were trading to be equally allocated to these venues, we might achieve (fragmentation) X = 0.96. In fact, the maximum level reached by X is some way below that.
The parameter of interest in our study is the difference of average market quality between a high (H) and low (L) degree of fragmentation or dark trading normalized by H − L. We therefore obtain the measure
where the coefficients are estimated by the QCCE method. For comparison, we also report the marginal effect β 1 + 2Xβ 2 . We estimate these parameters from the conditional variance specifications, too, in which case it is to be interpreted as measuring differences in variability between the two market structures. Standard errors can be obtained from the joint asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates given 18 above.
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Results
Before reporting our regression results, we investigate a few characteristics of our dataset in more detail. 17 The particular characteristics we are interested in are cross-sectional dependence and unit roots. The median value of the cross-sectional correlation for different measures of market quality ranges from 0.21 to 0.57 which points to unobserved shocks that are common to many firms. The econometric model we use can control for these common shocks.
We also investigated stationarity of the key variables as this can impact statistical performance, although with our large cross-section, we are less concerned about this. 18 The results from augmented Dickey Fuller tests indicate little support for a unit root in fragmentation or market quality. The average value of fragmentation does trend over the period of our study but it has levelled off towards the end and the type of nonstationarity present is not well represented by a global stochastic trend.
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5.1 The effect of total fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading on the level of market quality Table 1 reports QCCE mean group coefficients together with our parameter of interest ∆ F rag . ∆ F rag is defined as the difference in market quality between a low and high level of fragmentation evaluated at the minimum and maximum level of frag-16 An alternative way of comparing the outcomes under monopoly and competition is to compare the marginal distributions of market quality by means of stochastic dominance tests. We report these results in the online appendix.
17 For our empirical analysis, we eliminate all firms with less than 30 observations and all firms where the fraction of observations with zero fragmentation exceeds 1/4. That leaves us with 341 firms for overall fragmentation and 263 firms for visible fragmentation.
18 Formally, Kapetanios et al. (2007) have shown that the CCE estimator remains consistent if the unobserved common factors follow unit root processes. 19 The test results are available upon request.
19 mentation (equation (13)). For comparison, we also report marginal effects, which tend to agree with ∆ F rag in most specifications. As observable common factors, we include VIX, the lagged index return, and a dummy variable that captures the decline in trading activity around Christmas and New Year.
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Inspecting ∆ F rag , we find that a fragmented market is associated with higher global volume but lower volume at the LSE when compared to a monopoly. These effects are uniform across different quartiles (Table 1b) ). The increase in global volume in a fragmented market place is consistent with the theoretical prediction in
Biais et al. (2000).
We also find that temporary volatility is lower in a competitive market which It is also interesting to split overall fragmentation into visible fragmentation and dark trading where we define dark trading as the sum of volume traded at regulated dark pools, OTC venues and SI (Table 2) . When measured by ∆ V is.f rag. , we find that visible fragmentation reduces temporary volatility and lowers trading volume.
These effects are larger in absolute value in the third quartile of the conditional distribution (Table 2b) ).
In addition, a market with a high degree of visible fragmentation has larger bidask spreads at the LSE when compared to a monopoly, albeit that result is only statistically significant at 10%. De Jong et al. (2011) also find that visible fragmentation has a negative effect on liquidity at the traditional exchange. The finding that visible fragmentation may harm local liquidity is also supported by survey evidence.
According to Foresight (2012, SR1) , institutional buy-side investors believe that it is becoming increasingly difficult to access liquidity and that this is partly due to:
its fragmentation on different trading venues, the growth of "dark" liquidity, and to the activities of HFT. To mitigate these adverse effects on liquidity, investors could employ SORT that create a virtually integrated market place. However, the survey reports buy-side concerns that these solutions are too expensive for many investors.
In contrast, Gresse (2011) finds that visible fragmentation improves local liquidity.
Turning to dark trading, our results suggest that dark trading reduces volatility in particular for firms in the first and second quartile of the conditional volatility distribution (Table 2 ). Dark trading also increases volume while it does not have a significant effect on bid-ask spreads. In comparison, Gresse (2011) also does not find a significant effect of dark trading on liquidity while De Jong et al. (2011) find that dark trading has a detrimental effect on liquidity.
Turning points
In addition to investigating the difference between perfect competition and a monopolistic market, it is also interesting to assess the transition between these extremes. Figure 5 illustrates the estimated relationship between market quality on the one hand and overall fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading on the other.
We find that the transition between monopoly and competition is non-monotonic for overall and visible fragmentation and takes the form of an inverted U shape.
The maximum occurs at a level of visible fragmentation of about 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5 for global volume, total volatility and bid-ask spreads, respectively. That is, at low levels of fragmentation, fragmentation of order flow improves market quality but there is a turning point after which fragmentation leads to deteriorating market quality.
For temporary volatility and LSE volume, there is no interior optimum on [0, 1].
SEC (2013) has hypothesized that the turning point may depend on the market capitalization of a stock. For each individual stock, Figure 6 plots the interior max-imum against the time series average of market capitalization. 21 We find that there is positive but weak relationship between the maximal level of fragmentation and market capitalization that is statistically significant with the exception of temporary volatility.
The effect of total fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading on the variability of market quality
In this section, we investigate whether overall fragmentation, visible fragmentation and dark trading have led to an increase in the variability of market quality. We find that at the median, ∆ F rag. is not statistically significant but there is variation across quartiles (Table 3) : The variability of volatility is lower in a fragmented market for firms in the third quartile of the conditional distribution. Fragmentation increases the variability of bid ask spreads at the first quartile of the distribution but this result is only marginally significant. There is also a decline in the variability of LSE volume for firms in both the first and third quartile. But there are also some differences between these alternative variability measures. The positive effect of overall and visible fragmentation on the variability in bid-ask spreads is more significant for the inter-quartile range measure of variability when compared to the residual measure. In contrast to the latter, visible fragmentation has no significant effect on the variability of LSE volume.
Robustness
In the online appendix, we assess the robustness of our results to: (i) alternative market quality measures, (ii) splitting our sample into FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms and (iii) different estimation methods. Our finding that visible fragmentation and dark trading have a negative effect on total and temporary volatility is robust to using alternative measures of volatility such as Parkinson or within-day volatility.
If we measure market quality by the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, we find that a higher degree of overall or visible fragmentation is associated with less liquid markets. Dark trading is found to improve liquidity. For efficiency, we cannot find significant effects.
When comparing the effect of market fragmentation on market quality for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms, interesting differences emerge: The negative effect of dark trading on volatility is only observed for FTSE 250 firms. That effect is even positive for FTSE 100 firms. But in contrast with FTSE 250 firms, visible fragmentation is associated with lower volatility for FTSE 100 firms.
Finally, we re-estimate our results using a heterogeneous panel data model without common factors. This model can be obtained as a special case of model (3)- (5) where f t is a vector of ones and there are no observed common factors d t . A version of this model with homogenous coefficients has been used in related work by Gresse (2011), among others. However, that model cannot account for unobserved, common shocks in the data and gives inconsistent results in the presence of common shocks that are correlated with the regressors (Pesaran, 2006) . We report in the online appendix that omitting observed and unobserved common factors leads to results that differ in magnitude and statistical significance with the exception of LSE volume. However, the large increase in our measure of cross-sectional dependence (CSD) indicates that this model is misspecified because unobserved common shocks such as changes in trading technology or HFT are omitted that are likely to affect both market quality and fragmentation.
Conclusions
After the introduction of MiFID in 2007, the equity market structure in Europe underwent a fundamental change as newly established venues such as Chi-X started to compete with traditional exchanges for order flow. This change in market structure has been a seedbed for HFT, which has benefited from the competition between venues through the types of orders permitted, smaller tick sizes, latency and other system improvements, as well as lower fees and, in particular, the so-called makertaker rebates.
Against these diverse and complex developments, identifying the effect of fragmentation on market quality is difficult. To achieve this, we use a version of Pesaran's (2006) common correlated effects (CCE) estimator that can account for unobserved factors such as the global financial crisis or HFT. Compared to Pesaran (2006), our QCCE mean group estimator is based on individual quantile regressions that enable us to characterize the whole conditional distribution of the dependent variable rather than just its conditional mean. This estimator is suitable for het-24 erogeneous panel data that are subject to both common shocks and outliers in the dependent variable.
We applied our estimator to a novel dataset that contains weekly measures of market quality and fragmentation for the individual FTSE 100 and 250 firms. We decompose the effect of overall fragmentation into visible fragmentation and dark trading, and assess their effects on both the level and the variability of market quality.
We find that trading volume is higher if visible order books are less fragmented or if there is more dark trading. Also, fragmentation and dark trading lower volatility at the LSE. But dark trading increases the variability of volatility, while fragmentation has the opposite effect in particular at the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution which gives rise to some concern. 
and evaluated at H = max(F rag.) = 0.834 and L = min(F rag.) = 0. The adjusted R 2 is the R 2 calculated from pooling the individual total and residual sums of squares, adjusted for the number of regressors. CSD is the mean of the squared value of the off-diagonal elements in the cross-sectional dependence matrix. Notes: Coefficients are median CCE mean group estimates. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. Dependent variables are in logs with the exception of temporary volatility. Market capitalization, index return and VIX are in logs too. ∆ X (τ ) is defined as β 1 (τ ) + β 2 (τ )(H + L) and evaluated at H = max(X) and L = min(X), for X = {V is.f rag, Dark} with max(V is.f rag) = 0.695, min(V is.f rag) = 0, max(Dark) = 0.381, min(Dark) = 0. The adjusted R 2 is the R 2 calculated from pooling the individual total and residual sums of squares, adjusted for the number of regressors. CSD is the mean of the squared value of the off-diagonal elements in the crosssectional dependence matrix. (τ ) is defined as β 1 (τ ) + β 2 (τ )(H + L) and evaluated at H = max(F rag.) = 0.834 and L = min(F rag.) = 0. The adjusted R 2 is the R 2 calculated from pooling the individual total and residual sums of squares, adjusted for the number of regressors. CSD is the mean of the squared value of the off-diagonal elements in the crosssectional dependence matrix. T X (τ ) is defined as β 1 (τ ) + β 2 (τ )(H + L) and evaluated at H = max(X) and L = min(X), for X = {V is.f rag, Dark} with max(V is.f rag) = 0.695, min(V is.f rag) = 0, max(Dark) = 0.381, min(Dark) = 0. The adjusted R 2 is the R 2 calculated from pooling the individual total and residual sums of squares, adjusted for the number of regressors. CSD is the mean of the squared value of the off-diagonal elements in the cross-sectional dependence matrix. Notes: Dependent variables are the conditional interquartile range of market quality. Coefficients are median CCE mean group estimates. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. Market capitalization, index return and VIX are in logs. ∆ T X (τ ) is defined as β 1 (τ ) + β 2 (τ )(H + L) and evaluated at H = max(X) and L = min(X), for X = {F rag, V is.f rag, Dark}. Notes: The left panels show market quality measures and venue entry and the right panels show market quality and latency upgrades at the LSE. The time series are calculated as averages of the individual series weighted by market capitalization. Bid-ask spreads and volatility are multiplied by 1000. Series for volume are shorter due to data availability. The downside spike in the series is due to the Christmas and New Year holiday. 
